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In the aftermath of the Second World War, it was inevitable
that the victorious powers would for the second time in this century-
seek lasting peace through an international organization. Such
attempts to control and maintain the peace and security of the world
have teen regular occurrences since the time of Napoleon and the Holy
Alliance. The concept underlying this attempt would appear to be
based on the idea that a unity acquired during the stress and strain
of war can and must be retained during times of peace, and that the
enemy at a given time will remain the enemy. This is a rather rigid
view of the relations of nations and one which has been proven to be
false. Unity is built in times of optimism at the height of victory
but must last through the depressions and strain of peace when there
is no common bond with which to unite the manbers.
During times of crisis the bond is clear-cut. £ach member of the
alliance has a well-defined goal in the elimination of the designated
enemy and the restoration of peace.
After the crisis, in this case the fall of the German and Japanese
schemes of expansion, one must search more diligently for the adhesive
with which to hold the nations together. Throughout recent history,
the victorious combinations have sought to insure the peace of the
world by retaining that unity which won it. When, however, there is
um r4 ;. 1
no longer a common eneiiy against which the nations must combine to
protect their very existence, the nations tend to fly apart in pursuit
of their various and often contradictory interests. This is the basic
problem encountered by those with whom are charged the task of creating
an entity which will maintain the international peace and security.
They must create an entity which will be forged during the heat of
battle but which mast survive in that most dangerous time of all—a time
of peace. These men must provide that magic adhesive which will pre-
vent the many nations from going off on their particular ways and
thereby colliding to produce another holocaust.
Following the First World War* the nations sought the answer in
international organization in the form of the League of Nations. This
Organization, it is true, had many weaknesses which finally led to
impotency in the face of constant threats to peace, but it pointed out
the way. Hany scholars have noted that it was in the recognition of
such weaknesses that the strength of the League lies. The League was
a relatively realistic organization for its time in a world of jealou
sovereign nations and their separate interests. Its founders recognized
the limitations imposed by this world. For this reason, it was essen-
tially a weak means of maintaining the international peace and finally
no means at all. The experience of the brief life of the League of
Nations was of vast importance for the creation of the United Nations
following the second World war for three reasons. First, the League
indicated the need for such an organization in the maintenance- of
peace. The mere fact that it failed to accomplish this itself was
interpreted not as a denial of the entire idea but rather in terms of

weaknesses in its construction which could be remedied, "...the United
Nations does not represent a break with the past, but rather the
continued application of old ideas and methods with some changes ueened
necessary in the light of past experience," Second, it further
accented the need for cooperation between the great powers through such
an organization, A major problem throughout the entire history of the
League was that of the "empty chair " This included the chair of the
United States throughout its entire existence, and the Soviet Union
and Germany during a portion ox its lifetime. The fraoers of the
United Nations Charter learned this lesson well. Third, the League,
although interested mainly in collective security functions, revealed
a growing need for economic and social activities "to employ inter-
national i.iachinery for the promotion of the economic and social advance-
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raent of all peoples."
The League of Nations was a testing ground for international
organisation. Many of Vae provisions of the League nave not been
improved on tc any extent because they tfere rooted in the basic facts
of international life--that is that nations are sovereign in their
conduct of international relations and therefore not amenable to
control by any organization. The League m&s necessary for the creation
of the United ha Lions Organization.
The Charter of the United Nations can be said to oe similar to
the League Covenant in many ways. 'What is more significant, however,
1. Leiand M. Goodrich, "from League of Nations to United Nations",
International Organization (February 19U7) li>




4is to be found in the several differences which play a large part in the
subsequent development of the Organization.
Hie first of these differences and a problem which loomed large
from the start of the Charter creation process until the final draft was
formulated at San Franc Isco in T?hS was signed and ratified was the problem
of voting procedure. The voting procedure of the league of Nations was
based on the time-honored principle of unanimity in matters of importance,
especially in the maintenance of international peace and security and
therein lief a key to its inability to act decisively. Under Article 15,
Paragraph 1 is found the following provision: ,fIf there ehovld arise between
Members of x-he League1 any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not
submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article
13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to
the Council."-* This provision if taken alone and at face value would
appear to give the Council much power and authority in such settlement.
It is however complicated by the voting provisions found in Article 5,
Paragraph 1 "except where otherwise provided in this Covenant or by the
terms of the present treaty s decisions at any meeting of the Assembly
or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the
h
League rev resented at the meeting*" This provision of unanimous -voting
in the Council greatly hampered the process of rendering a decision in
the settlement of" disputes among the Member Nations. It is further
complioetotf by Paragraph 5 of Article h which reads: "Any Member of the
3» Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 15 ;> : nv 1#
k* Ibid., Article 5, Paragraph 1.
•6V JUr-
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League not represented on one Council shall be invited to send a repre-
sentative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the
consideration of matters specially affecting the interests cf that
Jiber of the League. ny Thus the League found itself generally unable
to take any decisions on matters affecting the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. The value of such discussion and considera-
tion as remained lay in the realm of political pressure applied to the
disputant members by the great powers present as permanent members of
tiie Council, "In the thirty disputes and more dealt with hy the League
Council under the settlement provisions, certain principles of action
emerged with clarity. Preeminent was the principle that its action was
likely to be most effective when directed to persuading both parties to
agree to a settlement rather than adopting recommenoations and trying to
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enforce compliance..." This technique was guarded by the need for
unanimity in the League.
The framers of the Charter saw the unanimity requirements cf the
Covenant as a major weakness which must be remedied in order for the
organ! i to function. One might question whether the results
furthered the drive toward majority rule but the intention was there.
The voting requirements of the Security Council consisted of a some-
what ingenious combination of the unanimity and the majority principles.
These requirements as found in Article 27 call for an affirmative vote
of seven out of eleven members of the Security Council except that on
substantive matters the vote shall be "an affirmative vote of seven
5. Ibid , , Article U, P&r&grttph i>.
6. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, (Second
impression, revised) Rinohart l> Company, Inc. liew York, 1539 p. 171»
•*r.
6mtfbQTE including the concurring vot.es of the permanent members."'
Procedure has seen fit to expand this substantive category thereby ex-
panding the number of issues on which the unanimous vote of the five
permanent aembers is required.
A second difference between the Covenant and tn; ^harLer can be
found in the composition of their respective Councils, The Council of
the League exhibited great fluidity of its membership both in terras of
permanent members and elected, members. The security Council of the
United Nations rather than being .fluid is quite rigid as far as its
permanent membership is concerned. Article 23 goes so far as tc specify
the lent mesnbers by name thus the only means by which either the
permanent membership or the numbers of elected members can be changed is
by amendment to the Charter.
A third major difference found in the two instruments relates to
the enforcement powers i.dven the Councils in the performance of these
functions. The Council of the League, besides being troubled by the
need for unanimous vote^ was also troubled by its inability to enforce
the peace as against the use of force by one or more members. In this
case, through interpretation of the Covenant by the member-nations,
the procedure was for each member to decide for itself whether or not
ember had "resorted to war in disregard of its covenants" and there-
fore whether appropriate actions should be taken by that aation
against the member. The role of the Council was "to recommend to the
several covernments concerned what effective military, naval or air
force the M^bers of the League shall severally contribute to the
7. Charter of the United Mationr, Article 2?, Paragraph 3.

aimed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the I- .; ."^
A major goal of the Charter was to create a centralized systeu of
onl'orcenent by giving the Security Council the power to "determine the
existence of any 'threat 10 ths peace, breacn of the oeace, or act of
aggression" and to "make recommendations, or decide what leas^res 3hall
be taken in accordance with Articles it! waA U2, to maintain or restore
9
international peace a.xd security." The Trailers of the Charter did not
stop with this provision, however, i'aey made previsions for strong
boa on the part of the Security Council anc iraeit so far as to
jvide for the estaoiishraent of anxed forces to "enable tb* :d
ilations to take urgent military neasuz^s." Under Article 25, all
members of the organization "agree to accept and carry out the decisions
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of the Secirrity Council in accordance with the present Charter." The
Security Council of the United riationo was intended to be in a position
to enforce peace. The United nations was to be like the League of
s^ationc— it could hardly be otherwise- -in that it would try persuasion
case of a dispute and n. art try economy sanctions, but it was
to ha\re both the authority and the pox-fer to use military sanctions —
force in the most conventional sense.
An additional aifTerence to be found is in the projected role
of the secretary -General al : even the Charter failed to antici-
pate the evolution of this position to its present stature in the
world. The Covenant provided for a Secretary-General to per xe
3. Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16, Paragraph 2.
y. Utioi'uer of the United Nations, Article 35 •
10* told ., Article h?.
!!• ibid ., Article 25>«

8adminis trativc work of the Organization. There was no mention of any
possible political role. The Charter ntade a small opening in this
field by including in Chapter XV a provision for the Secretary-General
"to bring to the attention cf the Security Council any matter which in
his opinion may threaten the r^aiutenance of international peace and
12
seeuritgr#n
-a proceeding ltj -ias only been a general one consisting of
some oi bfem .aajor and basic probie is and differences which resulted
..tteaipt on the part of the frame rs of the Charter to profit
from the "mistakes" as well as from the evolutionary process of t
League, -hey will figure prominently in the discussion of t lution
and constitutional changes of the Organization itself for ir •«!
been inoperable from the beginnir .
It is nov; appropriate to draw some conclusions MS the character
of the Organization which was ereate c in oan Francisco in l')h$. The
-poses of the United Nations as listed under Article 1 of the Charter
include the maintenance of intern ationul peace and secant
_, th lop-
• fidly relations the various nations based on the
principles of eoual rights &#d self-determination and the achievement
of international cooperation in problems of economic, social, cultural
or humanitarian character, T-.. . into consideration the evolution
of the system and ents which lea to the creation of
the Charter t it becomes clear that while the work to be perf. oy
a great international organisation like the waited Nations will reach
12. Charter of the United Nationo , Article 99.

ovit into many fields of human averj tihe central and roost fun.
;
. of its nany tasks will bo that ox preserving international peace
and security* The Dumbarton Oaks proposals concerned the almost
entirely with these questions and the balk of the resulting Charter is
a involved in this aspect of in ionsl relations. funda-
rcental goal of the United States was to establish a collect:/ ;aaiza-
tion capable of -maintaining international peace by placing prinary
eontrol over security questions in the hands of the great povtn-L-. A
jnuary goal was to begin about wnere the League left off in die
promotion of various econoraic and social programs which many th:
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had been the aftst constructive contributions made by ue. r
iri the maintenance of international peace and security, the
as outlined at /ancisco reveals .several distinct
characteristics* The Charter distinguishes between two aspects of
this function: pacific settlement of oisputes under C vl ana
eniorc action or action with respect to threats to v . ;e,
breaches of the aid acts of _ scion unaer Chapter VII,
oral Assembly and the Security Cfcunfeil are riven
-ortant roles in the process of peaceful settlement of utos
as may arise. The role of the o-enerai A3sc::i_, 1 one of on,
consideration, s.r><i with the exception of tetters currently being dealt
with a - .urity Council, rea aiion. The Gea.
.
iy$
y contribute to peaceful change by reeo "es
13. H, Field Haviland, Jr. , The Political Hole of the General
Asscmoxy, aaretm Press, Hew lork, 1^51 > p* 11*
•
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Li* for the adjustment of aAy situation regardles. igin,
walGh it tf lift lj to impair t isral welfare or irxendly relations
among nations.
->carity Council, in contrast, to the daneral Assomoly, is to
with the general welfare as a whole ou<, spec Xly
uitl ntenance of the ial.ernation.al peace and security, for which
it '':' >rimary re .. It -a^ given Srcaa1
enable it to fulfill its responsibilities, out in kibe flslA
of peaceful settlement the Security Council has no authority to impose
settlement. Dn \ taptfi 1I9 the security Council has consider-
able. -on in the as it night oat to brin6 aooat a pa ,-siactory
solution Tor a situation or dispute which might menace the peace.
Ln these methods are the a..thority to r bheds for
effecting sue ..lament, or even under Article 37» the an&hoflty to
propose the actual tents of such a settlement, Thus in lb . of
fjWlfic settlement of dispute*, there is a definite overl-i in the
Jo* orga.s of the Uni v ...ions Organi^ati.^, that
er to recommend as opposed to the power to impose terms of
.'
.
n, however, deals tvith another aspect of the
maintenance of peace—enforcement action in cases of breache. t the
peace, or throats to tt
_
. .;s. It is in this line that .or gives
the 3 ifc&heritg t- ti - irtty Council. ike Charter ts Ojai
explicit in its considerations of »es oi force on ..ional
scene. UQ.5 eoaeeraed nainteaanoe of international
peace and security it seek3 to limit the use of force by the nations of
-
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the world through means of developing a system by which the main U3e of
force is to be exercised by the organization itseif, or failing that
under the specific license of the organization and the Charter. The
means for employing the force used by the Organization are made available
to the Security Council alone. Resort to such means is conditional
upon a prior determination that a threat to the peace exists, or that
a breach of the peace or act of aggression has occurred. This deter-
mination is for the Security Council to make and no other organ of the
United Nations is competent to make it. Once this determination has
been made by the Security Council, it has rather wide discretion on
the measures to be taken. Under Article Ul which lists measures not
involving the use of armed force, one finds the possible use of: "complete
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations," ^ Should these measures not be
deemed adequate for the situation, the Security Council may, under
Article it2 "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockace, and other operations by air,
IS
sea, or land forces of Members of the united Nations." ' The Charter
provides the Council with a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist
it in these matters.
In any consideration of the enforcement functions of the Organization
1^* Charter of the United Nations, Article Ul.
l£. Ibid.. Article U2.
• BBSflq Brit .
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through the Security Council two factors must be taken into account.
First, the Security Council is controlled by the five per.uanent yiembers
trtio may exercise their veto right at any time under Chapter ifll* That
is to say a permanent member may not only pose the veto on a determina-
tion of a threat to or breach of the peace but may also veto any
decision of measures to be taken to restore the peace. Article 3>
contemplates at least two distinct voting processes. This can be traced
directly to the feeling that there could be no action taken contrary to
the wishes of a great power without sacrificing the organisation. The
second factor lies in those provisions which seek to set up anted forces
for the use of the Security Council, These provisions call first for
special agreements between the Members and the Security Council by which
they undertake to make available H armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security •" Unless and until such agreements
are negotiated and ratified, the Security Council is technically unable
to fulfill the whole of its responsibilities under Article U2. The
Charter, however, provides for this void through Article 106 "the parties
to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1^U3, arid
France shall in accordance with the provisions of paragraph $ of the
Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with
other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on
behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of
17
maintaining international peace and security." One must remember that
16. Ibid., Article U3-
17. bid., Article 106.
* o at- crulf





this scheme was intended t,o be but a temporary expedient.
What can be concluded on the suoject of enforcement actions of
the United Nations? Such actions by the terms of the Charter lie almost
entirely in the hands of the five permanent members of the Security
Council. The 3ig Five control the decision making process, they form
the Military Staff Committee and they constitute the interim measures
to be used prior to the ratification of special agreements setting up
a force for the Organization. The small nations have no role here. The
General Assembly is quite specifically cut out of the enforcement process
by Article 11, paragraph 2 which 3tates: "any such question on which
IS
action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council," and by
Article 12, paragraph 1: "While the Security Council is exercising in
respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the
present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations
vnlth regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so
19
requests."
One final aspect of the peace functions of the United Nations needs
to be considered. This relates to the duties of the Secretary-General.
i^or the first time this position was given a political as well as an
administrative role in an international Organization. Under Article 99
,! fhe Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of inter-
20
national peace and security." It was also proposed at the San
18. Ibid
.
, Article 11, Paragraph 2.
19 Ibid ., Article 12, Paragraph 1.











Francisco Conference that this Article be amended to give the Secretary-
General the right to bring such a question to the attention of the
General Assembly as well but this proposal was rejected because it had
already been decided that the Security Council should have the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and the amendment would violate this principle. This assignment of new
responsibility in a political field is indicative of a rising feeling of
confidence. This feeling was expressed by the First Committee at the
San Francisco Conferences "The assignment of this authority to the
Secretary-General manifests our deep trust in the Secretary-General to
perform his tasks impartially and in the interests of the world at
21
large." Thus the position of the Secretary-General gained in stature
over the same position in the League even before the Organization began
to function.
This then is basically what was constructed at the San Francisco
Conference in 19hS* The new Organization was intended to overcome the
faults of the League of Nations wnich were deemed responsible for its
ineffectiveness in the face of world crisis. The United Nations was to
be a centralized agency to insure as far as possible the solution of two
main problems, "the problem of peace and the problem of improvement of
conditions of mankind by international cooperation," 22 whereas the
League had operated entirely on a decentralized basis supported by the
concepts of unanimity and voluntary use of force to uphold its principles.
The question now arises as to whether or not the Organization in
I96I4 is in all respects that Organization created in 19hB and if not,
21 • Documents of U.N.C.X.Q ., Volume 6, p. 2U3«
22. Ibid
., p. 13.






how have the changes come about 1 When one is analyzing any organization,
it is important to look at the basic instrument upon which it is organized
for this reveals the outline of the purposes of the Organization and the
measures which the Organization is to use to accomplish these purposes.
One must remember however, that the basic instrument, in this case the
Charter of the United Nations Organization, has been drafted at a
certain time in history under certain conditions. These conditions are
not static* They are dynamic by nature and no constitution which ignores
this basic fact will long endure. For this reason such instruments tend
to be general and ambiguous in order that the organization which they
support can remain flexible in the face of changing circumstances. Few
organizations remain the same over extensive periods of time and the
United •lations Organization has ocen no exception, ft was intended to
develop through practice and it has done just this* At the time that
the Charter of the United Nations was submitted to the senate for consent
on ratification, the President of the united otates expressed this basic
fact: "Improvements wall come in tae future as the United nations gain
experience with the machinery and metiioas wnicn they have set up. For
this is not a static treaty • It can be improved — and, as the years
23by, it will be — just as our own Constitution has oeen improved."
This echoed the general intentions ox the framers as expressed by ,
.
Zefneddine of Syria: "The future action of the organization and its
members depends more on the support behind the provisions and the spirit
23» Francis 0. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, Proposals for Changes in





as it demonstrates itself in practice, than upon the text itself."'^
In order to facilitate such necessary development of che Organization,
it is necessary for one or both of the following characteristics to
adhere to the basic instrument • In the first place, there must be a
judicious balance of rigid with flexible provisions, major . Is
being on the latter. By flexible provisions are meant those provisions
which are capable of rather wide interpretation without necessitating
formal amendments. The second characteristic which lends to the oevelop-
ment is a relatively flexible amending process. This becomes critical
where the important provisions on which the life of the organization
depends are rigid in structure rather than flexible. Whatever can be
Baid about, the Charter of the united Wations, it does not lend itself
readily to formal amendments despite the attempts of the smaller
powers at ban irancisco to accomplish this.
The Charter is a multi-lateral treaty setting up an international
organization. It is in reality a highly flexible instrument capable of
far-reaching changes within the context of the treaty itself, where
there are rigid provisions in the Charter so tnat the only method, of
change is through formal amendment, it remains rigid and incapable of
development and evolution within the organization as a whole, for the
amending process is such that amendments can be included only with great
difficulty. The United Nations Charter would have been better constituted
for development to meet the current international system had the few
inflexible provisions been made more flexible, but in this case one













questions whether the organization would have progressed ueyvna tae
planning stage. The inflexible provisions are in the main those with-
out which the major powers of 19h rS would not have seen fit to join the
organization. These rights are zealously guarded through the ci nt
requirements.
The United Nations Organization has responded to the chan g
which bave taken plate In tho realm of politics since l^uh, fhe ao3t
basic of these changes is the breakdown of that unity of the five
permanent memoers of the Security Council upon which the fate ol the
Organization and indeed of the world was thought to hinge. .i^od
since 19tiS has been witness to a protracted cold war situation with
outbursts of heated conflicts in virtual ly every section of the woriu.
The cold war has shattered the unx^y of the permanent members and with
i ohe possibility that there can be agreement among them long enough
to allow the Security Council to function as it was originally intended.
"The Q Nations has not settled the political struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union, though it is only honest to remember
that the Charter assumes great-power unity and tnat tne Security Council
was not intended, to mediate between great powers or to bring thorn, to
book," iderefore the experience ol the united nations to date would
seem lo indicate that the early emphasis in discussions of t orter
on enforcement features was considerably overdone. Mot only is it
impossible, with tne requirement of great power unanimity for Se^ux
Council decisio is on substantive questions, to take enforcement action
25 « Eugene P. Chase, The united Nations In Action, McGraw-Hill










against a permanent member of the Security Council, but it is unlikely
that any action will be taken against a smaller state which has the
protection and support of a permanent member. If the United Nations is
to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, it is
clear that first emphasis must be placed on the improvement of relations
between the permanent members of the Security Council, and upon preven-
tive, not enforcement action. The United Nations ha3 had to develop in
its quest for peace after the collapse of what was considered a basic
necessity in 19U£.
The Constitution of the United Nations has been changed to meet
this development in the international situation but not through formal
Charter amendment. During tne eighteen years of its existence, there is
no record of an amendment reaching the final voting stage. This is true
despite the provisions made in the Charter for a "General Conference of
the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the
present Charter"*" to be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly
M if such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session
of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present
27
Charter* " Since the formal amending procedures are too rigid to allow
trie aaaessasy changes or the political circumstances nave net been
conducive to their use, other ways and means have had to be found.
Ihere are, in general, two way* by which the Charter of the United
Nations lias been subjected to changes wnich substantially affect its
26. Charter of the United Nations , Article 109, Paragraph 1








provisions though at the same time leave the text intact. These ure:
through non-implementation or non-application of certain provisio
i throu ;h interpretation by the various organs and n j.
In the first c / of informal cone t2 tut tonal ch , one rinds
the very core of the United Nations collective security sysUiii. i
system as mentioned previously is to be found in the provisions of
pter VII which delegate . ieufity Council one duty to decemine
the existence of situations in which enforcement or restoration action
is necessary as well as the taking of remedial measures. Of interest in
a consideration of informal changes by non-implementation are those
provisions which set fip armed forces for the use of the Security Council,
These are found in Articles U3 and k7 • These articles, in essence,
,
Item of agx&enenta 'by which the ilember Nations make
available to the Security Council specified contingents of their anted
fore - instrumentalities eecossary for the application
forceful easures, invite those lembers net represented on tae Council
to participate in discussions leading up to decisions conceazajuai
28
employment of contingents of thai iber's armed forces," make avail-
able ' ial air force conti. r combined international onfor cerrtent
action, "^ and provide for the creation of a Military &taff • Lttee to
se and assist t * iriiy Codicil in the performance of its
function.-: under Qbapter VII. The military Staff Gomiittee unc;«r the
Charter consist of BTh fs of Staff >. . nfianeiit m?b
of ecurity Council or their representatives. Any tiaaber of the
28. Ibid., Article ha
29. Ibid ., Article h$
......
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United Natione1 not permanently represented on the Committee shall be
invited by the Sonfcnitfcee to be associated with it when the efficient
discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation
30
of er in its work." The Military Staff Committee clearly has
two functions under .Article h?. They include advising and assisting the
Council "on all questions relating to the Security Ujuricil's
military requirements for the na> ice of international peace and
security, the employment and command of forces placed at Its disposal,
the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament .i 1 -*-1- An additional
task of ti - g "strategic direction of any
ar^'JO f'.>T laced at the disposal of the Security Council* """^ The
herefere partially function under the first of its Suties
re he state of the agreements called for under Article h3 but
ty depends completely on them. The reasoning behind the
above «exj 1 articles is clear. In 19U5 following the war the feelings
were tl Jet of the forces to be provided by these agreements will
33
cesse o- .city from the great-power Maaber states." ' ere at
that time the only powers capable of providing them. Assuming that the
boll forces would be forthcoming from the big-powers which could
bear the necessary burden, it w, se pOWere which were given the
eh forces, fhe Setfarity Council as such is not properly
const it - it::, the strategic direction of such forces as
i if therefore the framers found it aeeessary to
30. Ibid. , Article hi, paragraph 2.
31 • Ibid . , Article hi, par.. ;ra 1.
32. roid. , Article Ul f paragraph 3»
33. Grayson Kirk, "The Jnited Rations Charter: Report on the Third












have this orofessional military group to take charge of the strategic
direction of the forces as have been placed at the disposal oi the
Council and called out tot service under Article U.3* "The provisions
for these forces are far more categorical and precise than tfca r«fu«
wording of the League Covenant. Tbsy are cesi&ned to *li . _ . .
military power in the hands of the Council in advance 01 any situation
when they may be needed. n>
The Military Staff Committee duly met in accordance with its
directives arid issued its first report, on April 3U, 19kl , a report
which was to indicate the failure oi the entire concept of an inter-
national armed force. The live Chiefs of otai'f in their report on
the general principles to be applied in the creation oi' a security
Council armed force, were more noticeable in their disagreements than
in their agreements. There were at least seventeen points of disagree-
ment in the report of forty-one points irilfflg which were tne extremely
significant questions of the alee and composition of tne forces.
Though this amounted to less than one-half 01' the report as a whole,
the possibilities of the five permanent Mftaber* forming sucn a force
were proven without foundation. Among the points on which the oomnittee
disagreed were the over-all strength oi' the forces as to es determined
by uhe Security Council, any changes in this over-all strength, one
siae of the individual contributions of botn land and air forces, the
problems of self-defense and national emergencies, questions oi with-




decree of readiness for the force, provision of assistance and facilities
including rights of passage for armed forces, rights of sovereignty,
and stationing of forces not engaged in Security Council enforces
activities. It is possible to trace a general line of da-ia. a •>-*-
tween th - ;s on the various points, Ihi..
cases follows the cold na* division between the Soviet jnxon on oat side
and ambiaation of the remaining four permanent members on the other,
There are, of course, several . _ cm i.uich tne division tended to
fellow great power as against leaser power interests but these were
definitely in I :. rarity. As excellent example of tne extent of die*
•Msest are to be round in tao posivioas of the .xjviet Onion and the
United Statee on Article .1, Article 11 dealt with Mm contributions
of the various a to the ov.r-iil armed iorces. i'ne bovie t position
on fchia article was i. 'jrai: "the over-all size of the armed forces
made available to the Security wouucil will not be too large, {here*
fore the five states can make armed forces available on tee principle of
equality... parable contribution s wouia ie«td to
advantages in the petitions of certain states xu the contrxuution of
armed forces,.." ' The s --on of one tnited states and the regaining
members favored | inciplc arable contribution eased on the
abilit he aefeeo&a to tfiatributa and Balling tne boviet position
unrealistic end o^cr-rigic
tnis way the tajor part of Article ;, or the C lerter fell*
The only tl iilitary staff Committee was cibie to agree on
35. "Report of the Military Staff Committee to the Secreta • -
General", 30 April 19u7, United Nations Soeueenta 336, p. H.






was to Beet* It found itself xncapa-.ie of developing even the general
prii ,, by whica the araea forces oi' tue security Council would
evernea. On August 6, i^ne the Military Staff Cemitt
o the i resident of the security Council; "Inaaameh
uaani&vitf cou^d not be achieved en the question - kin Overall Strength
Gcuspesitios oi the united. Nations Armed forces (Item I of tae
toork) , it was, a priori, impossible to consider ItOM l ^
aad Ui el -he Prafraauas el tfark, dealing with tne contributions bj
..iiuas."" i'his impasse in the work of the Military Staff
ktt«f ...... net >eea resolved* AUL of this was inevitable in the
diii ; Lc lich followed the cicoe of the war and the creation of
.tio&S organization And even wit a the oeoesaar? agreements
article u3> it is difficult oo see now this projected system
could woik, "••.it would appear that tne failure to create the laeonanism
for enforce leat action envies la the united Nations Charter is attri-
butable oot to the anilaterel opposition ef the soviet Jnion, but to the
bilateral listrust of t&e Soviet union and of the western oioc...'!l ^''
Ehig is ealv half oj. we story of Chapter VII tnough, Ac the
present tiate no nation uas negotiated, and ratified the necess^r-y agreo-
s Seourity touacil go nates contingents of arisen forces
available* and there is little hope beat there will be any agreements
in the ihle future* here fell one hopes of the founders that
y->. "tetter from the Chair, ion of the Militar" Staff G
the ^resident of the security Council," o August 19U8, iJaited Nations
Dearie'--; 4-. s/°16.
Ls L» Claude, Jr., "The United Nations and the 'Jse of Force",
Inter.ia t1.o-.-.--.?. Conciliating
,
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38. Chase, op, pit., p. 3§5*
39. fercy^ o. y /lb., -. 12.

to perform. This has not been due to quicker action than was antici-
pated in the concluding of special agreements under Article U3« Failure
to make any important progress in the conclusion of these agreement
s
has left the void anticipated by the Charter, but toe inability of the
permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate has rendered
ineffective the provisions of Article 106 for filling that gap. In
fact the basic cause of the weakness oi the Security Council has been
the inability of its permanent mentoers to agree, not the absence of
firm commitments on the part of Members to provide forces and facilities
under the terms of the special agreoment of agreements envisaged in
Article k3*
The significant portion of Article 23, in terms of non-application,
is its orovision for election of non-permanent members with due regard
being paid to: "the contribution of Members of the United Nations to
the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other
purposes of the Organization" as well as to "equitable geographical
distribution." This means granting Security Council .Membership to those
states that, because of their strategic location, economic resources, or
manpower reserves, can make a significant contribution to security. At
the same time, consideration should be given to equitable geographical
distribution. This is a requirement which seeks to assure eventual
representation to all states that are members of the Organization. The
decision as to whether these criteria are followed is left solely to the
I|D. Charter of the United ijations , Article 106.
smq
-
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Assembly which appears to have determined its selections more on the
basis of geographical and ideological representation in recent years
than on the character of a member's contribution to security.
A second method by which a constitution can be changed is through
the interpretation of its several provisions by the various organs and
members. This is the process by which constitutions usually develop
to meet an expanding situation without necessitating resort to formal
amendments. In the case of the United Nations Charter, this is most
likely the more important of the two types of informal amendment
which have occurred throughout its short history. The members have
engaged in a concerted drive to make the Organization function when
its basic premise of unity of the major powers of the world failed.
This resulting evolution can be most easily traced through an examina-
tion of the three bodies charged with the maintenance of international
peace and security and their process of development.
In the case of the Security Council to which was delegated the
primary responsibility for such maintenance, the major stumbling block
has been its voting rules. Article 27 calls specifically for decisions
on substantive matters to be reached by "an affirmative vote of seven
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members" and.
this leaves little ground for maneuvering. It is quite specific in
that on the face of the article there is no room for absence or absten-
tion of a permanent member. Over a period of time however, "every one
of the Permanent Members has at one time or another admitted the
legality of the Council's adoption of resolutions requiring its con-
U
currence despite the fact of its own abstention." The practice of










abstention has assumed chief importance as a device by which some
flexibility has been introduced into the rather rigid voting procedure
of paragraph 3.
Due to the inability of the Security Council to perform its
primary responsibilities, the remaining organs of the united Nations
have found it necessary to take upon themselves increasing responsibilities
for peace keeping. The most striking examples of this have been in the
cases of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly* The basis for
the great expansion of these organs in this field given alnost
exclusively to the Security Council by the Charter lies in a very
liberal interpretation of the provisions of the Charter concerning them.
There lias been a definite shift of responsibilities from the Security
Council to the General Assembly and thence to the Secretary-General •
_Le this shift is not illegal per se, it is highly questionable in
terms of the original intentions of the founders, but then they expected ,
the Security Council would be able to perform all of its functions with
speed and effectiveness. "In meeting these tests there is no convincing
evidence that the Assembly has Introduced innovations which are
specifically prohibited by the Charter. Yet it is obvious that changes
have taken place which have gone beyond the expectations and the inten-
tions of the Charter's fraraers. E*Wf constitution ever written however
has had to be' amended by interpretation' under the pressure of events.
Constitutions that do not bend are vary apt to break. As long as the
overwhelming majority of the community favors such a change by inter-
pretation and as long as that change does not inflict undue violence




feasible but desirable, VJhen an institution ceases to respond to the
will of the great majority, it has lost its vitality as a democratic
instrument." In those situations where the Security Council has
been able to function effectively it has been allowed to.
The rise of the position of the General Assembly in peace and
security matters began before the creation of the Organization. The
Dumbarton Oaks proposals were quite specific in this matter. "It
would appear, however, from the statements of those who actually par-
ticipated in those discussions, that the provisions with regard to the
organization of peace and security which were incorporated in the
Proposals definitely envisaged a clear-cut division oi responsibility
and functions between the Security Council, in which the Great lowers
were to occupy a dominant position, and the General Assembly, the
organ of the rank and file of members." 4 -* These proposals met with
considerable raodificatioa in the Charter Conference and "the provisions
relating to the functions and powers of the General Assembly, however,
were extensively modified, aid these changes added up to a considerable
increase in the potential importance oi the rule of that organ."
Thus began a long period of evolution for the political role of the
General Assembly.
Shortly after the Secarity Council began Its functioning, it
became Apparent that the necessary unity would not be in evidence. The
^ower was being used to further the cold war split and prevent
1+2. Haviland, op. cit ., p. 16?.
1+3 • Leland M. Goodrich, "Development of the General Assembly"






the organization from acting* The original intentions regarding the
application of the veto have been explicitly set forth by Cordell
Bill In his memoirs where he lists two conditions regarding its use,
R
Ir< all the discussions irith my associates in postwar planning, two
important conditions had been understood and repeatedly stated in
connection with the veto. The first was that none of the permanent
members of the Council would exercise its right of veto capriciously
or arbitrarily. It would call this power forth only on a matter of
the gravest concern to itself, never on secondary matters and never
in a way to prevent thorough discussion of any issue. The veto would
be exercised in the same broad cooperative spirit that pervaded the
preparatory efforts on the major nations leading toward the creation
of the United Nations. It is obvious that the provision was universally
intended to aid and facilitate the maintenance of permanent peace by
the security organization.
The second condition was that we were thinking largely of the
application of the veto power to military and other means of cotrroulsion.
In conferring upon the proposed Council the authority to control and
direct at least some of the military forces of the member nations to
any point where the council believed the exercise of force was
required we also had to give the major nations that would furnish
8tt«h force the right of veto. It was our thought, therefore, that the
main focus of the veto would be military and other means of exercising
force, such as economic sanctions, and not the numerous other issues
that were certain to come before the Council."^ Neither condition was
k$* Cordell Hull, The ilemoirs of Cordell Hull , MacMillan Co.






The development through practice of Articles 10 and tk commenced
early* The first instance of the submission of a political problem
to the General Assembly came as early a3 the second part of the first
session with the submission of the question of the treatment of
Indians in the Union of South Africa. Since that time this practice
experienced a steady expansion. In some instances questions have
been submitted directly to the Assembly without prior reference to the
Security Council, in others questions have been transferred from the
Council as a result of a stalemate in that organ, and in a few
instances both the Assembly and the Council have dealt concurrently
with the sane case though generally not with the same aspects of it.
The obvious advantages of transferring a case to the Assembly are the
absence of any unanimity rule and the fact that more countries,
including important middle as well as small nations, may participate.
The disadvantages are that such a move may be considered contrary to
the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace end security according to Article 2U of the Charter, that it
Silly antagonizes one or more of the great powers, that it makes
recommendations by a two -thirds vote of the Assembly which
might possibly be contrary to the view of many of the more important
ers^ and that the Assembly, unlike the Council, does not have the
' hority to use sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.
reasoning behind the increased interest of the General Assembly in
politics! affairs where the Security Council is blocked remains
ntially the sa-ie today as it was at the time the representative of
&A j .
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the United States stated in regard to the Greek question in 19h7»
"The continued failure, so far, of the Security Council to take effec-
tive action in this case because of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics 1 veto cannot, in the opinion of the United States Government
preclude individual or collective action by States willin jt, eo
long as they act in accordance with the General, purposes and principles
of the United Nations, This is particularly true when such individual
or collective action is in support of a policy or course of action
which has the approval of a clear preponderance of the permanent and
non-permanent members of the Security Council. In the case of the
blocking of Security Council action by the veto, we are confident that
the General Assembly will exercise its powers to the limit for the
protection of Greece."
The first real efforts on the part of the General Assembly to
deal directly with the problem, of the veto were in terms of efforts
to influence the Security Council itself to use it strictly in accord-
ance with those conditions noted at Sen. Francisco, The first formal.
action on the part of the General Assembly to deal directly with tne
problem of the veto is to be found in the General Assembly resolution
dated November 21, 19U7 In which the General Assembly requested its
special Interim Committee to consider the problem of vo a the
Security Council. Based on the report of the Interim Committee, the
General Assembly on April 1U, 19h9 recommended to the imbers
of the Security Council that they seek agreement among themselves upon
^6* Security Council Official Records of lSOth Meeting,
12 August~19U7







what possible decisions by the Security Gouncil they might forbear
to exercise their veto, when seven affirmative votes have already been
cast in the Council, giving favourable consideration to the list of
such decisions contained in conclusion 2 of part IV oi the report o t
the Interim Committee. The recommendations of tne General Assembly
were unable to change the voting situation in the Security Council,
They were aimed more at the symptoms "Uian the cause. "Tho over-ail
problem of the 'veto* is the organisational manifestation of tno
fundamental lack of mutual trust among nations. Gradually trie
Assembly has lost hops of reforming the Security Council directly and
has turnsd to exploring various maaas of strengthening tnc Assembly's
u?
own authority in the political field."
The two most noteworthy attempts made to enable ttie General
Assembly itself to meet increasing responsibilities in febju id nave
been the establishment of the interim Committee in 15U? ana Jie adoption
in 19pO of ihe Waiting for Peace resolution which lay aown new procedures
for meeting aggression. In assessing die assembly's role is ail o^
these attempts to prevent aggressive intervention one must l
that the plenary organ was not originally designed to deal with
requiring the collective use of forces, fet because oi Inability
of the Security Council to take aci.cn with respect to Jr
Communist Ml intervention in Korea, the only alternatives i
either- to turn to the Assembly or allow the united Nations to tic
entirely paralized ~by the 'veto'.
U7. Haviland, op. cit ., p. lsiu
-1*4*
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The General Assembly resolution 111(11) became the first major
effort in this General Assembly build-up process. This resolution
established: "for the period between, the closing; of the present session
and the o of the Btxt re ;3ion of the General Assembly, an
Interim Co--:\ittee on which each Member of the General As.c: 11
kg
feart the right to appoint one representative. 1*^ This committee wag to
consider matters referred to it by the General Assembly, those disputes
'ituations proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly,
-ods to be adopted to deal with the general principles of cooper-:, tion
in the maintenance of international peace and security, whether there is
&d for the summoning of a special session of the General Assembly and
to conduct investigations it deemed necessary and useful. Thus the
Assembly look the first step in preparation for increased responsibility
in political matters by insuring its availability between regular
sessions. Until this time the Security Council, was the only body
designed to function continuously, la accordance with the letter of the
^ter., the resolution reaffirmed the predominant position of the
Security Council in matters :irir the neaee and security of the
world. This Interim Committee » - reaffirmed and re-est-bildtled by
General Assembly resolution 29$ (IV) of November 21., 19h9 with expanded
powers. It has fallen into disn?--. in.ee that time as its functions
becane institutionalized and improved upon in 19<?0.
Lng made this encroachment into the work of the Seouritv
Ud* Genoral Assembly Resolution III (II) of 13 November I9U7*
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..rented to the sixth session of the General Assembly; "in the time
at its Disposal, the Committee has not been able to do more than
make a ixrst general survey of the problems connected with the organi-
sation of united Nations military resources, and it is fully aware
that its report on this large and complex subject is in no sense
complete. f: As of September JO* 195>1> the responses of the Member
.xons oil U'ieir support of uhe resolution numbered some thirty-eight
whxcn iucluded some four negative and five simple acknowledgements.
"The 'transfer' and 'emergency session' aspects of the Resolution
bave oeen recently revived and now are probably an integral ;.art of
the united ^ax-ions system, but ... the other elements of Uniting for
Peace are now more or less inactive because of an early decline in
their use or- lack of any practical use at all.''''^ Since I960 even
taese elements would appear to be declining in importance as the
xrity Council strives to reassert its position, it was able to
proviae for UnxUsd nations peace restoration actions in the Congo and
Cyprus cris«fl though noc. the type of action originally envisaged in
tno Ghartttsw
o Korean erxsis was not only significant in terms of the
fciat&sg alio development of the General Assembly but it was an early
manifestation of x.he role which the Secretary-General would come to
-o^u iia&xons aifairs. "The constitutional implications
ox ja conflict afieeted other u. N« organs besides the
§H« *I|ep©rfc of the Collective !'iea<3ures Coramttee" in General
Assemb ly Off xciax aecorus Vi, Suited Nations Document k/1391, p7 th*
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Oxford as, Lc i • '53»
55. F. R. Scott, "The World's Civil Service" Inter lal
Cone: - (January \$$k) p. 27^-.
5SI Charter of the United Nations, Article 98.
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How has this been accomplished? When it has been impossible to
muster sufficient votes in the Security Council or the General Assembly
for any proposal of substance, members have usually been content to
adopt one ro expedients: avoid substantive decisions by suoh
respectable diplomatic devices
res^' Llity for action to the Secretary-General by declari
broad terras . .apples of the 1
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mpractical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the
purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and
Jordan in the present circumstances and thereby facilitate the early
60
withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries. il
When the Security Council found itself once again able to render
a decision on such matters, there was no appreciable change in the
enforcement method adopted. On lit July I960 the Council decided to
"authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in
consultation with the Government of the J^epublic of the Congo, to
provide the Government with such military assistance as may be
necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government
with the technical assistance of the United Nations the national
security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government to
6l
meet fully their tasks, " ' In other cases the policy-making organs
have merely handed problems to the Secretary-General by concluding
consideration of the matter with an understanding that the Secretary-
General, in the normal course of his duties, would give the matter
attention. In both cases the result is the same in regard to the
responsibilities of that office.
This resulting increase in the responsibilities of the Secretary-
General and Secretariat has not been confined to the political field
however. There has also been a remarkable expansion of economic and
social programs. Originally, the main task of the Secretariat in
60. General Assembly Resolution 1237 (E3-III) of 21 August 1953
United Nations Document A/3905.
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economic and social affairs was to service the policy-maKing organs.
At an early stage, however, the Secretariat was asked to inaice studies
and undertake research. By 195>0 it had been given responsibilities
for substantive field operations, and these operations have increased
in extent and in importance. Only in relation to dependent territories
has there been a contraction in the responsibilities of the United
Nations. This substantial increase in the executive responsibilities
of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat has not been accompanied
by the necessary expansion of the machinery with which that Organ must
work: and the office has been greatly strained as a result. Due to its
increasing involvement in military operations, one of the more crucial
needs is for military specialists to advise the Secretary-General on
such matters. The Secretariat is not equipped for operating in the
military area in the least for this was to be the sole responsibility
of the Security Council with its Military Staff Committee.
The expansion of the Secretariat and aore especially the office
of the Secretary-General has not gone unnoticed. The Soviet Union
began a campaign against any strengthening of the Secretary-General
at the expense of fee Security G uncil, which it can control, as
early as 19^0 when it became evident that the Secretary-General was
to be something more than an administrator* This drive was climaxed
by the recent proposal of Chairman Khrushchev to abolish the position
of the Secretary-jeneral and institute instead "a collective executive
body of the United Nations comprising three persons each of pk
would represent a certain group of states. M°2 These three groups of
62. United Nations Review , (November I960) ?j3o.
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states were to be the Western Alliance, the Soviet States and the
Neutralist Bloc. That this proposal failed is indicative of the
desires of the member nations that t he United Nations should somehow
function tjherever and whenever possible. In the position of the
Secretary-General, the or tion at last has some degree of flexible
and intelligent means of adjustment to the needs of the international
community.
Since its inception, the United Nations has witnessed' two
separate but related trends in its constitutional development. These
are a definite shift in the early 1950' s of the peace enforcement
decision-making process to the General Assembly followed by a return
to the Security Council with the decline in great power direct in-
volvement, "This year has seen a further return of the Jecurity
Council to its central role as the organ of the United Nations which
carries primary responsibility for peace and security. Thus, the
: stion of South Africa and especially the question of the Congo
have been major tasks with which the Council has been exclusively
'.zed. The reason for this return to the Security Council from the
General Assembly is, naturally, that both these questions have been of
a nature which has to a degree placed them outside the conflicts of
today between the main power blocs. The shift of the emphasis b
from the General Assembly to the Security Council has, however, not
led to a change of working methods, as the Council, following the
recent procedures of the Assembly, has used the services of the
retariat and the Secretary-General as its main executive &gant«* ^
63. Dag Hammarskjold, "Introduction to the Annual Report of
the Secretary-General 1' General Assembly Official Records XV, United
Nations Document A/^390/Add. l»,~o. 3.




This leads into the second trend, the steady development of the role
of the Secretariat. This organ has now established itself as a true
executive for the Organization*
Has the character of the United Nations Organization been
qualitatively changed by these informal "amendments?" The purposes
of the Organization have not changed in the least. They remain to
maintain international peace and security, the development of
friendly relations among nations and the achievement of international
cooperation in the related fields of economic, social, cultural and
humanitarian problems. The only substantial change has been that
the methods of achieving these purposes, especially in the field of
peace aid security, as established in the Charter, being highly
unrealistic, have generally failed. That the Organization functions
at all in these questions is to be attributed to the ingenuity of
its Members in finding means of change short of formal amendments in
the face of big power disunity.
There are at least four very basic changes in the Character of
the Organization, In the first place, those peace enforcing functions
which were to be performed by the big powers are now performed almost
entirely by the smaller powers. This is evident in the composition
of the various United Nations forces. The concept of using the major
powers to maintain the peace through means of uniting their collective
strengths in the application of pressure has given way to the concept
of big power exclusion. The goal of this current concept is the
maintenance of the peace by keeping the major powers from becoming





any typo of enforcement action are such that this new concept is
possible. They have been in large part of the civil war variety in
which the chief protagonists in the cold war are not directly involved.
This method of preserving the peace was quite definitely not intended
by the framers of the Charter at San Francisco.
A second change lies in t,he unexpected development of the
functions and authority of the Secretary-General. The powers given
this office in the Charter do not on their face indicate his true
role as the guiding light of the Organisation* This has been a
result of the judicious combination of personal initiative and
organizational necessities.
A third change deals with the expanded position of the General
iy# By means of the introduction of this organ into the peace
and security aspects of the organization's functions, it far exceeds
the intentions of the big power framers as specified in the Ikimbarton
Oaks proposals, as well as those of the small power delegates at the
San Fraucisco Conference, History has tended to force the United
Nations into the pattern of the League of Nations as far as the
functions of the Security Council and General Assembly are concerned.
Fourth and closely related to the first three changes one
must note the greatly changed position of that body to which is en-
trusted the maintenance of peace, the Security Council. Over the
course of time this body has lost the major portion of its enforce-
ment machinery through lack of unity of the permanent members. It has
only recently regained some oi' the stature with which it was endowed
by the framers, however, this body no longer possesses those
.
U6
magisterial powers once thought so important. The Security Council
now .finds itself working through the Secretary-General instead of
through its Military Staff Committee, The character of its forces
are not those authorised in Article u3«
founding fathers saw as the cause of the failure of the
League of Nations its decentralized processes of arriving ao a find-
in.- O.ation of obligations or breach of the covenant and its
voluntary ^auctions. They sought in the Charter of the United Nations
to make this Organization a strongly centralized one in which a
small body consisting of all of the great powers as permanent
members would render binding decisions designating specific violations
of international obligations. This body was given extremely broad
powers once such a determination bad been made and each Member of the
Organization was to be bound by such decisions. The instrument set
up specific machinery for enforcement to put teeth into the enforce-
ment action. What has actually occurred as far as the basic
character of the Organization is concerned is that due to the failure
of this centralized system of peace enforcement, the United Nations
has retreated to a position which might possibly be said to be more
decentralized than that of the League, Under the League there were
definite obligations to take certain measures once a mem-ber had
determined a resort to war in disregard of its covenants. Under the
United Nations even this has fallen. The Members are obligated
only when the Security Council has made the appropriate determination
under Chapter VII and, as has been 3een, this happens very seldom,
Under the League it was not possible for one member nation to block





the action of the Organization altogether whereas under the United
Nations this also can be done providing at least one permanent
iter opposes the proposed action*
Current methods of peace restoration and maintenance consist
of two distinct steps neither of which constitute any obligations on
the Marabera* First a determination is r.iade a3 to whether action
ahou] baleen by agencies of the United Nations. This will be
made by the Security Council if possible $ otherwise by the General
Assembly under its transfer provisions-. Inherent in this determina-
tion is the decision on whether the necessary action lies within the
purposes of the Charter. No obligations follow from this determination
as would have been the case under Article 39 • Once the first step
has I completed, the focus of action shifts to the Secretary-
General who is charged with taking the appropriate action. Any
forces necessary will be the result of voluntary contributions
rather than any obligations. Thus the total effect of the several
constitutional changes within the United Nations is to do away with
the obligatory centralized nature of the Organization and substitute
a rather loosely coordinated system, for this is now the function of
the Organization — to legitimize and coordinate the activities of
its Members rather than to command*
'
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